the Figures (a Handbook)

the Twinsies Haunting our desires

Imagine a statement of fact. Imagine that it divides itself in two like a cell. Imagine the two identical statements side by side. Imagine they both begin to move and then abruptly walk away in opposite directions. Let’s follow them both and see their fates. One becomes an anecdote, a singular detail significant for its existence in a singular story. The other becomes a citation, a statement that circulates far beyond itself such that the fact of its circulation forms an anchor of significance.

It is difficult to stay with the knowledge that the two statements remain the same but hold that knowledge because this is not a logic exercise.

Some people see something certain in the belief that facts do not care about your feelings, as though facts derive power from a noble indifference. This personification of facts distorts their nature and misrepresents our relationship to them. We bring the feelings to that relationship. We develop a fondness for some facts and a dislike of others, deny many of them and try to inhabit a few. We arrange them into structures and assign them purpose. For instance, when someone tells you that facts do not care about your feelings, the person almost always does so as a lead in to their own beloved fact, the one they believe remakes everything. The truth is that facts don’t achieve things any more than they refuse to feel things. Facts exist and sometimes they barely do that.

The present time reverberates with a desire for revelation. Our collective feelings for facts stem from this old searching mission. But this time is different, impatient. We’ve taken matters into our own hands. We’re living Revelation made manifest by the Information of a billion gods. What flickering hermeneutic lights them all up?

A quote is a kind of fact. A quote simply claims that a statement exists, and you can verify that claim by following the citation. Here is a quote within a quote from an article titled, “The Birth of Google,” written by John Battelle and published in Wired magazine in August 2005. Batelle writes that Larry Page, reasoned that the entire Web was loosely based on the premise of citation - after all, what is a link but a citation? If [Page] could divine a method to count and qualify each backlink on the Web, as Page put it ‘the Web would become a more valuable place’."

Here is another fact: In April 1998, Larry Page and Sergey Brin published their article, “The Anatomy of a Large-Scale Hypertextual Web Search Engine.” It has become a citation. According to Google scholar, it has been cited 23,952 times and now 23,953 times with the writing of this essay. Page and Brin’s idea launched a thousand ships. Some would say they set an empire in motion. Their engine gave meaning to the singular statements floating in the Web’s ether.

Citations generate value mainly by measuring volume. The value is set by the number of times a statement is referenced. The count is indifferent (so to speak) to the statement’s content, and that radical feature became a bug in Google’s engine. Or else it was a bug that became the feature.

(This is not an homage to the humble anecdote. Remember, the two statements are the same.)

The notion of “impact factor,” refines the metric further by determining the mean number of citations, a calculation that requires determining “the total number of citable items,” which is a truly strange concept.

Where citability x volume/time&place determines a statement’s value, it is possible to have a fact of measurable significance that is, operationally speaking, anecdotal. Such was the case for the water samples that LeeAnne Walters collected from her home tap in Flint Michigan in 2015. The lead levels in the samples, as measured by Miguel Del Toral and Marc Edwards, were published on a website, flintwaterstudy.org, and not in a peer reviewed journal with an impact factor. The Michigan Department of Environmental Quality cited that latter fact as reason not to grant the data any importance. No one can follow all the facts. Like, which of the facts from this paragraph would you choose to follow were each one to break in two and walk off? What reason would you give for your choice? Support your claims with correctly formatted references.

Here is another strange thing: when citations became hyperlinks, statements stopped moving. They no longer need to move. Now we go to them, each of us mystics traveling through our own private Idahos on fact finding missions. We’re all divining in the Information Age, hunting patterns, unsettled by déjà vu, haunted by the uncanny, following our gut, courting sense, winking. It is terrifying and also wondrous out here on the brink of the sublime.

paradox and other difficult assignments

Rhetoric’s slipperiness stems in part from its casual attitude toward all sides. It shares this quality with queerness and other forms of nonduality. Some of those other forms aim to cultivate or dwell in the indefinite. Rhetoric is strange among these forms. The indefinite is its base state and yet it has a talent for heightening distinctions between things just as well as it can dissolve them. Rhetoric has a knack for generating explanations for phenomena when accepted narratives become disrupted or insufficient. While we tap rhetoric’s sense-making talent continuously, we rarely plumb the depths of it because it is hard to dwell in the indefinite. We prefer that rhetoric simply make sense of things for us, and it does. It provides, for instance, categories that can be made definitive and it clarifies relationships. Take for example the notion of cis and trans genders, which resolves the tyranny of male and female gender assignments by establishing a different basis for organizing gender identity. The concepts of cis and trans organizes gender in a way that explains, e.g., two people born with similar organic features where one identifies as feminine (cis) when the other does not (trans).

Rhetoric is adept at introducing novel associations and resolving incompatibilities by generating dissociation. It does this without concern for how the dust will settle but don’t confuse it for your change agent. Rhetoric’s designs more often than not fold back into an uncanny affirmation of the status quo. Notice, for instance, how happy it makes some people to declare themselves cis gender with determined confidence. “Look at me,” they say with breezy affect, “so secure in this new dichotomy where you can be you and I can remain me without upset to anyone other than the timid and troglodyte!”

Rhetoric, a sense-making device, is as indifferent to that smug stability as it is available (theoretically) to its antagonist. That is where rhetoric differs from a queer form of nondualism, which is never indifferent to gender and that deliberately aims to unsettle gender dichotomies be they arranged around male female or cis trans.

This project, Io Loves Koko, a slow rolling rhetorical queer handbook & house of fashion, aims to pair those energies. Indifferent and deliberate - a pairing that is neither a program nor dichotomous, neither a cancellation nor a complement but a pairing nonetheless, a paradox perhaps, because it is hard to dwell indefinitely in the indefinite and maybe not altogether desirable.

Indifferent and deliberate form a nondualistic pairing of energies with which to greet assignments, that key element of gender that the notions of cis and trans helpfully questioned before further erasing. The question, you’ll recall, went something like, “is it a good idea to assign everyone at birth, based on certain features, either feminine or masculine roles and then insist that they stay in those roles the entire course of their lives?” It was a very good question. But then what was the answer? Was it, “no, because now we understand that gender identity just flows naturally through us?” Was it, “no, and [bizarrely] that means more gender-affirming healthcare though still no funding for menopause research?” Was it, “yes, but in a less heteronormative, more liberal, you-do-you way?” Was it, “no of course not and some people have figured that out and rejected their assignments and others have also figured that out and, while they haven’t rejected their assignments, they recognize that it is something that happens and is perfectly okay to do?”

You see our point, maybe. The most prominent answers over-rotate on liberation from assignments as if the assignments served no purpose beyond arbitrary subjugation of personal expression.

It is true that the justifications for gender assignments at birth are dreadful and it is also true that all the subsequent gendering of assignments that follows, e.g., who pays the bills and who soothes and who cleans what, are more distracting than helpful. But the current arguments about gender identification no longer engage the problems with gender assignments or gendered assignments. The problems once again feel reified or at least lost in the whirl of a backlash. People are focused on whether transgender is a real thing, asserting the question by way of another rhetorical dissociation, the one that distinguishes real from unreal. This commonplace likely feels familiar (is climate change real?; was it really rape?). The real unreal dissociation refuses, denies, erases, and stalls indefinitely. It obstructs any other way into a topic including and especially ways that might allow for complexities to take root. In this case the argument eclipses other questions about gender assignments, setting us once again adrift from the related matter of how else, other than at-birth gender assignments, we might organize household chores and childcare and public facilities and healthcare and sports and leadership and our interior lives.

In an attempt to get back to that question, here is one more “no” argument against at-birth gender assignments, although we wish to place a large bold * on it. The argument is this: gender is most potent as a fluid state where it becomes available for multiple uses.* Before we get to the *, allow us to underscore that, for us, answering “no” is less a matter of democratizing gender identification than a matter of repurposing a massive schema. So, yes, by all means identify with femininity and masculinity, with femininity or masculinity but know that gender’s organizing function becomes more interesting where we keep an eye on the assignments and recognize the weight of them; where we recognize the effort it takes to inhabit and sustain a gender while completing various life assignments be they externally given or self imposed. It cannot be overstated how difficult it is, for example, to give birth with masculinity or to be credible with femininity. Just try speaking or listening while identifying as either. All of it is made difficult by the combination of having every assignment gendered and each of us trying to maintain a coherent sense of our selves. Completing (gendered) assignments with any coherent sense of (gender) self is just really difficult, which may explain why it remains so popular to only pair masculine people with masculine assignments and feminine people with feminine assignments despite good evidence that it is an unworkable approach to life.

The liberatory approach to gender assignments tends to minimize the difficulties. Where self-liberation becomes the organizing principle, gender can seem a superficial style that you can swap out as easily as switching from solids to patterns. Breezy variations on “gender fluidity” encourage everyone to be masculine in the boardroom and feminine in the kitchen, or else to re-make all the assignments gender-neutral so that everyone can be whatever they want while doing whatever they want because now we value a feminine style of corporate leadership and a masculine style of cooking. This is as good a place as any for a too brief mention of gender’s inextricable relationship to race, the historical availability of femininity and masculinity, and what Christina Sharpe refers to as the anagrammatical form that gender takes where paired with Blackness. The dream of frictionless gender fluidity imagines gender as an accessory in an autonomous self that was forged in and through various exploitative conquering projects.

*The liberatory approach to gender expression skates past that history and the deeper purpose that gender serves in crafting its related assignments, none of which are innate by the way. The TERFs really don’t do themselves any favors on this point when they claim their assignments as exclusive, but neither does the character Reese in Torrey Peters’ popular novel when she does the same thing and in ways that smack of misogyny. If anything, this antagonistic gatekeeping brings into focus the ways in which stale disturbing gender stereotypes continue to serve as qualifying and disqualifying events. Like, Reese “letting herself” get beat up by her boyfriend…qualifies her? And Caster Semenya’s athletic excellence…disqualifies her?

The extent to which essentialism has crept back into gender identity illustrates how hard it is to maintain a gap between gender and assignments. We seem to be confusing gender’s pull for some inevitable imperative rather than allowing it to be the weight and complexity of gender expression in service to a life assignment—social stability, invention, truth, speed, romance, extractive economies, housekeeping, revolution, parenting, art.

So let us return to that smug person who confidently declares themselves cis and also to that person struggling through a masculine pregnancy. The cis trans dichotomy helps neither work through what gender is doing to us or expands what we could do with it. That may be because we now mainly use the dichotomy to manage what we refer to as personal preferences. To speak of gender as a preference, a practice that admittedly may be limited to the impoverished imagination of the professional class, is to defang its transformation. In any case, the idea of personal preference diminishes the complexity of our collective assignments. Think for a minute about just how flimsy a line personal preference really is. What pronouns do I prefer? What do “I” prefer? Gosh, where to start. I would prefer this meeting have a different agenda. I would prefer not to scrub soap scum off the shower tile today but am going to do it anyway. I would prefer that the man at work who holds organizational power over my job assignments not abuse that power in service to nursing his little personal grievance about how I spoke to him. In the great grand gendered scheme of things, asking which pronouns I prefer feels like the thinnest chump change. Where and when did we settle on preference as the pivotal term? Is it even an option to give as much thought to the pronouns “I” and “we” as now given to she and he? Can we talk about the disappointment that is the singular they?

None of this frustration is a call for gender neutrality. In so far as answering “no” means “gender neutral,” it is the neutral of rhetoric’s indifference, an organizing force that cuts in multiple directions. But rhetoric does not derive its power from its indifference. Like gender, rhetoric’s power consolidates through sustained expression, or “dull repetition.” Rhetoric is indifferent but we are deliberate in our use of it. That is the point of our “no” answer. It is an answer that pairs indifference with the deliberateness of queer life so that we can be both indifferent to people’s gender identities and also more deliberate in our gender expression.

What does it mean to be indifferent to how people identify and also more deliberate in our gender expression? We answer with an illustration.

Performance artist Taylor Mac tells us that Judy is a form queen. What does that mean? It may mean that Judy believes we might learn something about form from a feminine practice of it (oh, a delicious gender assignment at last). Mac has embraced that assignment as a life’s work, and Judy’s excessive, clinquant performances are the yield of Judy’s deliberate, careful fulfillment of that assignment. It is repetitive work, though in Mac’s case hardly dull. Why does it matter to the assignment, you might ask, how Judy identifies? We wish please to rephrase the question: How does it matter? It matters in that the assignment requires committing to femininity in all its parts, even (especially) the despised ones. It is hard to appreciate that work if we are only indifferent to gender identity. For instance, sustaining the assignment requires Judy to be credible and here is where things get interesting for everyone. Here is where the significance of gender reassignment becomes apparent; where the question of form becomes so crucial. How do you achieve credibility in a feminine form? It feels impossible because credibility requires qualities that femininity lacks by definition. “Organic,” cis expressions of femininity lack credibility most of all, as illustrated by Reese’s reactions to the other women in her women’s group. To be feminine is, by definition, to be brainless, and so femininity appears the more effortless it seems. This condition presents a predicament, by the way, when everyone is asked to state their pronouns. The sense of a trap may be the reason that exercise so often fails to queer the space. A desire to avoid entrapment may be why some people embrace the cis with such enthusiasm. Willingly identifying as cis at least affords a semblance of consciousness (a little act of resistance). But the predicament is not so easily unwound, which is why it is important to understand that Mac’s answer to the pronoun question is not a joke. It’s deliberate. Judy sees the suspect spectacle that is the feminine as the exact right necessary form for the stories Judy wants to tell. It’s not that the stories are “her” stories. Its that they can only be told while inhabiting that Unfaithful Meretricious Overwrought Discredited form that some how, impossibly, turns the vacuous dense. And if we are convinced of femininity’s necessity in this case, if Judy succeeds, then we come away with the queer possibility that we may really need the feminine and people who know how to occupy it. That is to say, we may need to accept some sticky gender assignments.

The Thaumasmus Universe

Here is a headline from today’s newspaper: “Six Members of My Family are Hostages in Gaza. Does Anyone Care?” Her question invites us to marvel at indifference. As someone who lives far away from Gaza and knows no one in Israel, it would be true to say that I only care about the author’s family in some basic way. And, the response to her question that came to mind was this: When Israel denied Palestinians permission to leave Gaza, even to conduct business as routine as a medical test, did you care that Gaza’s residents were in a sense hostage? My point being not to catch someone in hypocrisy but to deflate the sense of thaumasmus her headline generates so that we might see care’s close relationship to indifference.

Thaumasmus: to marvel at something rather than to state it in a matter of fact way.

What purpose does thaumasmus serve in the middle of a horror show? Beware its invitation to turn our attention. Caring is a matter of orientation, not volume. What would more caring prompt us to do that we do not already know needs to be done? It is cruel to withhold humanitarian action from Gaza until everyone figures out how much we all care. (Don’t think our inaction stems from a need to analyze evidence.)

Here is a headline from no newspaper ever: No One Cares. The mere act of reporting a story brings it within the universe of Things About Which We Care, which is why statements of fact often feel more humane than expressions of emotion and why journalism so often feels manipulative. It feels especially so when it commands our attention.

More troubling than any lack of care is the likelihood that someone will convince us to consolidate and pool it. Care financing is the real business of social media. Crowdsourcing care is the cynic’s take on democracy. While social media hollows out collective action, the archaic technology that is international accords and agreements suffers the realization that care is always cruelly bias and easily co-opted. To care about some one thing requires not caring about something else. That is care’s dull condition, and also why the personal is political, and also why we so often resort to some sense of bureaucratic indifference to fill in the gaps.

A diary kept by Ziad in Gaza illustrates the choices that care necessitates and why it is best understood as the other side of indifference. Ziad began his account when he evacuated from his home in October and has continued writing through the weeks that have become months of bombings. Amidst social breakdown and while living with strangers, he took in one and then several stray cats. Ziad faithfully reports on each cat’s condition, including the one that recently became pregnant. The first orphan cat needed treatment for an injured eye and Ziad and his sister went to some lengths to secure it medical attention. They are always on the look out for cat food.

If assessing their choices by How Much We Care, we would ask, should Ziad and his sister be concerned about cats while people go hungry? Are they mad? Immoral? Some might defend them by quoting the popular bumper sticker, “commit random acts of kindness.” Each of those responses mistakenly assumes that care aligns with goodness. But the most deliberate, radical acts of care always telegraph its terrible exquisite truth: its justification stems from the selective fact of it, not from any innate virtue. The care economy turns just, indifference becomes a superpower, not when randomized or ideologically coherent, but when operating like a lighthouse—a Manara—which is the name that Ziad gave to the cat.

Gut Politics

I have a dim memory of a 1980s street protest. It was part of a larger demonstration that had shut down several blocks of downtown. Four or five college students (they seemed older than I was) stood shoulder to shoulder in thrift store suits and ties. A carnival barker told the crowd what we were about to witness. Each one of our performers, he explained, had consumed mash potatoes colored with food dye and they would soon puke red, white, and blue. We stood in the rain as the suits jumped up and down and gagged themselves. It didn’t go as planned. Everything came up grey, but even that proved a good metaphor.

Their act has stayed with me in part because it felt like a form of social grace born from rot; a kind of fermented democracy.

I’m interested in what its long form might look like. Something infinitely better than speaking truth to power.

The puke protest coincided with Oliver North, Anita Hill, the birth of gentrification and Roger Ailes’ television. A cynical entertainer had ascended to the White House. Our current uncanny moment is punctuated with zombies from that administration.

A few other things happened in the 80s like the feminist classic 9 to 5 and the phrase SILENCE=DEATH, which today, in the age of political chatter, sounds almost blessed. In 1985, the year that the Philadelphia police bombed MOVE, the activist-artist collective Group Material participated in the Whitney Biennial to the detriment of their outsider image. To redeem themselves, they launched a project on democracy that culminated in a town hall on the AIDS crisis. Critic David Deitcher said of the event that it had “a sense of participating in something token, in something staged and recorded, of partaking in a process that…played little or no part in the [participants'] daily lives” and that foregrounded the “nostalgic and mythic aspect of the ‘town hall’ currency.” He went on to say that it proved “how intractable are the obstacles in this society to widening the range of political debate, to opening lines of communication between constituencies with divergent interests” and “to effecting a sense of urgency in the midst of a culture that militates in so many sophisticated ways against change.”

I think the puking street performers had a good sense of those intractable obstacles. They responded from the gut. We’re all hosts to dirty politics and it takes some resolve not to flinch when that mishmash of speech doesn’t look at all what you expected once it hits the pavement.

In hindsight, part of the appeal of their performance was its nod toward big tent politics, the grimy rejoinder to the clean, composed town hall. The big tent—cramped, muggy, interminable; impossibly more vast inside than it appears and staked on the faith that layers of sticky social habits make worlds—a hot house for discursive germs.

We didn’t yet know in the 80s about the wonders of gut flora but the decade’s analog signals resembled a political practice built in its image. Time for a revival.

Wallis, Brian, Ed., Democracy: A Project by Group Material (Seattle, WA: Bay Press, 1990).